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Abstract:
Climate regulations tend to target at energy intensive sectors whose products are
widely used in industrial production as intermediate inputs, such as electricity, and the
carbon abatement may be partially offset by intermediate input-led leakage. This
paper aims to examine the impact of intermediate input linkage on the carbon leakage
both theoretically and empirically. On theoretical part, we develop a Harberger-type
model with an input-output linkage structure, identify four leakage effects and derive
closed-form solutions for these leakage effects. On empirical part, we build a
computable general equilibrium model of China for empirical simulation and
introduce Structural Decomposition Analysis to link both the theoretical and empirical
models. By imposing a carbon price on the electricity generation sector, our results
show significant carbon leakage. Our decomposition analysis further suggests that
such a leakage is mainly through the production substitution effect, followed by the
multiplier effect. Both of the two effects are closely related to the intermediate input
linkage, and thus shed some light on importance of considering sectoral linkage when
discussing the carbon leakage issue of climate policies.
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1. Introduction
With two-week-long hard work and concerted efforts of all the parties involved in
December 2015, a landmark Paris Agreement was reached, charting a clear course for
global cooperation on fighting climate change to hold the average rise in global
temperature well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit
the temperature increase to 1.5° (UNFCCC, 2015). For governments around the world,
the urgent task of implementing the details of the agreement is to prepare plans and
actions in line with their national priorities to achieve the goals set in their intended
nationally determined contributions. Because energy-intensive sectors are major
carbon emitters, it should come as no surprise that climate policies will target at these
sectors. This would lead to carbon leakage across sectors, given that the products of
the regulated sectors are widely used in industrial production as intermediate inputs,
such as electricity and the share of intermediate inputs per unit of outputs increases
gradually (Xu and Dietzenbacher, 2014). This domestic leakage may in turn offset the
carbon reduction of the regulated sectors (Zhang, 2012; Baylis et al., 2014; World
Bank, 2015). This highlights that intermediate input linkage may be an important
influence factor of carbon leakage. For instance, Böhringer et al. (2014) found that
domestic industries may rather suffer than benefit from anti-leakage measures under
the consideration of intermediate input structure. The purpose of this study is to
clarify the relation between the intermediate input linkage and the carbon leakage, and
to evaluate the leakage effects of China’s climate regulations on the electricity
generation sector.
The theoretical model of this study builds on Harberger (1962)-type general
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equilibrium model aimed to study the effects of climate policies (e.g., Fullerton and
Heutel, 2007; Fullerton and Monti., 2013; Lanzi and Wing, 2013; Baylis et al., 2014;
Elliott and Fullerton, 2014; Rausch and Giacomo, 2016). However, these studies
mainly adopt the independent sector assumption or vertical serctoral linkage (e.g.,
Bushnell and Mansur, 2011; Fullerton et al., 2012; Sen, 2015), and a systematic study
on the effect of sectoral linkage on carbon leakage is lacking. To capture the impact of
sectoral

linkage

on

the

carbon

leakage,

we

extend

Baylis

et

al.'s

two-independent-sector model (Baylis et al., 2014) by introducing intermediate input
linkage structure. This study disentangles four leakage effects 1 and derives the
closed-form solutions for these effects. All of these effects are related to the
intermediate input linkage either directly or indirectly.
We find that the intermediate input linkage has important implications for
assessing the carbon leakage problem. First, the change of gross output and emissions
due to consumption change is influenced by the intermediate input linkage structure
directly, which is named the multiplier effect. Second, the producers would adjust the
intermediate input structure because climate policies result in higher price level of the
energy intensive products, which is closely related to the production substitution
effect. Third, the intermediate input linkage has an indirect impact on the magnitude
of the scale and consumption substitution effects. For instance, close industrial

1

The literature presents different leakage channels, such as fossil fuel channel (e.g.
Dröge et al., 2009), competitiveness channel (e.g. Bruvoll and Fæhn, 2006; Zhang,
2012), terms-of-trade effect (e.g. Baylis et al., 2014; Di Maria and Van der Werf,
2008), technology channel (e.g. Golombek and Hoel, 2004; Sijim et al., 2004;
Gerlagh and Kuik, 2014; Dröge et al., 2009), abatement resource effect (Baylis et al.,
2014), intertemporal channel (e.g. Eichner and Pethig, 2015; Michielsen, 2014), and
scale channel (e.g. Kuik and Gerlagh, 2003; Karp, 2013). The Harberger-type model
is applicable for discussing the short term effects of climate policies; therefore, this
study does not consider the technology development and intertemporal channel of
carbon leakage. In addition, similar to Baylis et al.'s study (2014), this study omits the
fossil fuel channel.
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linkage means that the relative price change is small, and the consumption
substitution effect, which reflects the environmental impact of consumption structure
adjustment due to relative price change, would be relatively small.
The empirical study of this paper focuses on the effect of climate regulations on
the electricity generation sector in China using a computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model. The electricity not only takes the largest share of direct emissions but
also is a crucial intermediate input used in most production activities. China’s carbon
emissions trading pilots pay special attention to the impact of intermediate input
linkage on the environmental effect of climate regulations. One key feature of China’s
carbon trading pilots is the regulation on both direct and indirect emissions from
electricity generation (Zhang, 2015a,b). The previous studies (e.g., Bernstein et al.,
1999; Babiker, 2001; Kuik and Gerlagh, 2003; Mathiesen and Mæstad, 2004; Barker
et al., 2007; Antimiani et al., 2013; Meunier et al., 2014; Böhringer et al., 2016) focus
mainly on the developed regions’ regulations and on leakages between developed and
developing countries. Our study focuses on an analysis on the carbon leakage of
China’s climate regulations between regulated sector and unregulated sectors, and
thus will broaden our understanding of carbon leakage and enrich the policy relevance
of existing studies.
There is a close relationship between the Harberger-type model and the
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, which are adopted for theoretical and
numerical studies of the paper, respectively. Chumacero and Schmidt-Hebbel (2004)
classify Harberger-type model as a CGE model. Kortum (2011) states that the
Harberger-type model can be observed as a simpler version of the CGE model. The
previous literature links these two models by changing the key parameters of the CGE
model (Carbone, 2013) or by inserting parameters taken from a CGE model to the
4

theoretical results (Lanzi and Wing, 2013). Adopting Structural Decomposition
Analysis, this study proposes another method to link the theoretical and numerical
models, and we quantitatively evaluate the magnitude of four leakage effects. The
simulation results show that China’s climate regulations on the electricity generation
sector would generate a negative sectoral leakage, which is mainly determined by the
production substitution effect and the multiplier effect, both of which have a close
relation with the sectoral linkage.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this study clarifies
the direct and indirect impact of intermediate input linkage on carbon leakage of
sectoral climate regulations from the perspectives of four different leakage effects.
Second, the study develops a Harberger-type model with an input-output linkage
structure, which can represent two countries linked through intermediate goods trade
or a closed economy with two interdependent sectors. Third, the study proposes a
method to link the theoretical and numerical models by adopting Structural
Decomposition Analysis and quantitatively evaluates the magnitude of different
leakage effects. The policy implication is that policy makers should consider the
domestic sectoral linkage in the determination of climate regulations and anti-leakage
measures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a
Harberger-type theoretical model with an input-output linkage structure and derives
closed-form expressions of four different leakage effects. Section 3 builds China’s
computable general equilibrium model for empirical simulation and introduces
Structural Decomposition Analysis to link the theoretical and empirical models.
Section 4 discusses the simulation results. The conclusions are presented in Section 5.
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2. The theoretical model
With the development of production fragmentation, firms in different sectors and
regions are more closely connected to each other through intermediate input linkage.
Sectoral linkage may have an obvious impact on the environmental effect of climate
regulations. In order to present the relation between intermediate input linkage and
carbon leakage, this study extends the model presented in Baylis et al. (2014), which
assumes two independent sectors by introducing the sectoral input-output linkage
structure. Our model allows us to quantify the impact of intermediate input linkage on
carbon leakage under a small change in carbon tax. The theoretical model of this
study is presented in the following subsection.

2.1 Theoretical model
2.1.1 Production
In a closed economy, two competitive sectors ( i, j  X , Y ) each use intermediate input

M i , clean input K i and carbon emissions Ei ( m, n  M , K , E ), with decreasing
marginal products in a constant return to scale production function. The final output
of the sector i ( Oi  f (M i , Ki , Ei ) ) satisfies both final demand of consumers ( Ci )
and intermediate demand of the other sector j ( M j ). The intermediate input share
is  xM  M x Py / Ox Px and  yM  M y Px / Oy Py . The clean and dirty factor input share
is  xK  (1   xM ) xk ,  xE  (1   xM ) xe ,  yK  (1   yM ) yk ,  yE  (1   yM ) ye , where

ik and  ie ( ik  ie  1) is the share of clean and dirty input to gross factor input.
We assume that sector X has greater carbon intensity (  xE   yE ). Differentiating
each sector's production function, we have:

Oˆi  iM Mˆ i  iK Kˆ i  iE Eˆi

(1)
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The presence of a hat notation above any variable represents each proportional
change (e.g., Oˆi =Oi / Oi ). Firms would adjust the input structure with the relative
price change, and this corresponds to the production substitution effect. For instance,
they would reduce carbon emissions per unit of output by incremental capital
investment. Harberger-type model with three or more inputs usually adopts Allen
elasticities of substitution. Karney (2016) proposes a method to switch from Allen to
Morishima elasticities and demonstrates a one-to-one numerical equivalence of
models using two different elasticities. Therefore, our paper also adopts Allen
elasticities of substitution and defines the elasticity of substitution between
i
intermediate and factor inputs of sector i as emn
, we obtain:
i
i
i
i
i
i
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ

 M i  Ei  iM (eMM  eEM ) Pj  iK (eMK  eEK ) Pk  iE (eME  eEE ) Pei

i
i
i
i
i
i
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ

 Ki  Ei  iM (eKM  eEM ) Pj  iK (eKK  eEK ) Pk  iE (eKE  eEE ) Pei

(2)

The capital is moveable across sectors, with the same return ( Pkx  Pky  Pk ) and
a fixed supply ( K  K x  K y ). By completely differentiating the capital constraint
equation K  K x  K y , we obtain:

 x Kˆ x   y Kˆ y  0

(3)

where  x and  y are the sectoral share of capital distribution between two sectors
and satisfy  x   y  1 .

2.1.2 Price
Perfect competition and constant returns to scale imply zero profit, so
PO
i i  Pj M i  Pk Ki  Pei Ei . Completely differentiating these equations and using

companies' profit maximizing first-order conditions yield:
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Pˆi  Oˆi  iM ( Pˆj  Mˆ i )  iK ( Pˆk  Kˆ i )  iE ( Pˆei  Eˆi )

(4)

According to equation (1), we find the relationship of the proportional change in
price levels.

Pˆi  iM Pˆj  iK Pˆk  iE Pˆei

(4a)

The price level faced by consumers ( Iˆ ) is determined by the price level of two
sectors (
share

Cx Px  C y Py
C y Py
Cx Px
Iˆ 

Px / Px 
Py / Py
Cx Px  C y Py
Cx Px  C y Py
Cx Px  C y Py

of

income

spent

on

sector

i

). Supposing i is the

( x  PxCx / ( PxCx  PyCy )

,

y  PyCy / ( PxCx  PyCy ) , and x  y  1 ), we obtain:
Iˆ  x Pˆx  y Pˆy

(5)

According to the production approach of nominal gross domestic product ( N ),
the mathematical expression is N  (1   xM )Ox Px  (1   yM )Oy Py . By log-linearizing
the above equation, we obtain:

x   yM y
 xM x  y
Nˆ 
(1   xM )(Oˆ x  Pˆx ) 
(1   yM )(Oˆ y  Pˆy )
1   xM  yM
1   xM  yM

(6)

The economic scale is represented by the real gross domestic product ( G ),
which satisfies G  N / I . Through log-linearzing, we obtain Gˆ  Nˆ  Iˆ . Climate
regulations would shock the economy scale and influence the final emissions. The
scale effect of carbon leakage is obtained from the change of real gross domestic
product.

2.1.3 Consumption
We assume that all tax revenue ( R  Pex Ex  Pey Ey ) is returned to individuals via a
lump-sum rebate. Under the budget constraint ( rK  R  PxCx  PyC y ), identical
8

individuals maximize homothetic utility ( U (Cx , Cy ; Etotal ) ) by choosing products from
the two sectors. This paper assumes that the welfare gain from carbon reduction
( Etotal  Ex  Ey ) is separable in utility (Baylis et al., 2013) and focuses on the
welfare effects from consumption. Under the assumption that pollution is separable in
utility, we define  u as the elasticity of substitution in utility between different
products.
Cˆ x  Cˆ y   u ( Pˆy  Pˆx )

(7)

Consumers would adjust the consumption structure with the final price change,
which influences the sectoral emissions. We obtain the consumption substitution
effect of carbon leakage. According to the product market clearance assumption2 and
the

intermediate

input

share,

we

obtain

Ox Px  Cx Px   yM Oy Py

and

Oy Py  C y Py   xM Ox Px . Completely differentiating the above two equations yields:

( u  1) yM y ˆ ˆ
Oˆ x  Cˆ x 
( Px  Py )
x   yM y
(  1) xM x ˆ
Oˆ y  Cˆ y  u
( Py  Pˆx )
 xM x  y

(8)

The final output change due to unit consumption change is influenced by the
intermediate input coefficient iM , which is named the multiplier effect. In addition,
equation (8) shows that the multiplier effect has a close relation with the consumption
substitution elasticity.  u  1 means that the share of income spent on regulated and
unregulated produces keeps consistent ( Cx Px  Cy Py ). Then the final output has a
linear relation with the final consumption, and two variables share the same

2

The product market clearance implies that that the value of gross output equals the
sum of intermediate input and final demands Ox  Cx  M y and Oy  Cy  M x .
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percentage change.

2.1.4 Climate policy
We assume that a climate regulation only applies to the carbon intensive sector X .
Pˆex  

(9)

Pˆey  0

(10)

In addition, this paper assumes the capital price level is chosen as the numeraire.

Pˆk  0 . There are 18 variables and 18 equations for the theoretical analytical
framework, and the model is solvable mathematically. The parameters, variables and
equations of the theoretical model are summarized in Appendix A.

2.2 Decomposition analysis of theoretical results
2.2.1 Scale effect
The environmental effects of climate policies through the expansion or contraction of
the overall economic scale, which is represented by real gross domestic product (real
GDP, G ), is named the scale effect ( SE ). The mathematical expression of the
percentage change of G is shown as below.
(   yM y )(1   xM ) y  ( xM x  y )(1   yM ) x
(1   u ) yMy (1   u ) xMx (1   xM )( yM  1)
Gˆ  x
( u 

)
 xe
1   xM  yM
x   yMy
 xMx  y
1   xM  yM



(x   yM y )(1   xM )+( xM x  y )(1   yM )
1   xM  yM

x
x
x
x
(1   xM )[ xM  x (eME
 eKE
)  (1   xM ) x (eKE
 eEE
) xe

2
 yM
 (1   yM )
(1   xM ) yMy   xM ( yM  1)x (1   xM )(1   yM )
y
y
y
y
 y (eMM
 eKM
)  yM
 y (eKM
 eEM
)] xe 
 xe
1   xM  yM
1   xM  yM
1   xM  yM
1   xM  yM

(11)
The closed form solution for the percentage change of the real gross domestic
product is represented by parameters and the exogenous policy shock. The results
show that the sign of the change of real gross domestic product may be positive or
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negative. This is consistent with the debate on the double-dividend hypothesis of the
environmental policies (Fullerton and Metcalf, 1998; Goulder, 1995). We can see the
scale effect is related to the intermediate input linkage through two different
mechanisms. First, the scale effect is influenced by the intermediate input linkage
structure, which is represented by the intermediate input coefficient (  xM and  yM ).
Under the extreme case that two sectors are independent (  xM   yM  0 ), we obtain
x
x
Gˆ   x (eKE
 eEE
) xe xe  (x y  y x ) u xe . We can prove that climate regulations

under the carbon intensive sectors would reduce gross economic scale3, if we ignore
the intermediate input linkage. Second, the scale effect has a close relation with the
x
intermediate substitution elasticity of both regulated and unregulated sectors ( eME

y
and emM
). This reflects the impact of intermediate input linkage change on the

environmental effect of climate regulations through the scale effect indirectly.

2.2.2 Consumption substitution effect
The

final

output

and

final

consumption

satisfy Ox Px   yM Oy Py  Cx Px

 (Cˆ  Pˆx )  yM y (Cˆ y  Pˆy )
and Oy Py   xM Ox Px  C y Py , and we get (Oˆ x  Pˆx )  x x
,

x   yM y
x   yM y

  (Cˆ  Pˆx ) y (Cˆ y  Pˆy )
(Oˆ y  Pˆy )  xM x x

. Inserting them to equation (6), we obtain
 xM x  y
 xM x  y
NGDP  x (Cˆ x  Pˆx )  y (Cˆ y  Pˆy ) . This can be observed as the mathematical

expression of real gross domestic product under the consumption approach.
According to the relation between real and nominal gross domestic product

3

When  xM

 y / y   x / x .

0

and  yM

According to

0

, sector

x
eEE
0,

X

we obtain

has greater carbon intensity means
RGDP  0 .
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Gˆ  Nˆ  Iˆ , we obtain

Gˆ  xCˆ x  y Cˆ y

(12)

The climate policies shock the final price level faced by consumers, and the
(1   xM ) yM
1   xM
change of final prices are Pˆx 
 xe and Pˆy 
 xe . When
1   xM  yM
1   xM  yM

 yM  1 , we obtain Pˆx  Pˆy . This means that the consumer would face a relatively
higher price level of products of sector X . Then consumers would adjust their
consumption structure and improve the share of consumption on products of the
sector Y . The environmental impact of a consumption structure adjustment due to
relative final price change is named the consumption substitution effect ( CSE ). The
mathematical expression is shown below:

  (1   xM )(1   yM ) xe
Cˆ y  SE  u x

1   xM  yM

(13)

CSE

We can see that the CSE is positive. When  xM  1 or  yM  1 , all products of
sector Y or X are used to satisfy the intermediate demand, and products of two
sectors are not substitute. Therefore, the consumption substitution would be zero.

dCSE
dCSE
 0 , this means that the closer the sectoral linkage is, the
 0 and
d yM
d xM
smaller is the change in relative final price levels, and the scale of the consumption
substitution effect would be much smaller.

2.2.3 Multiplier effect
According to equation (8), the final output change due to consumption change is
influenced by the intermediate input linkage through the multiplier effect ( ME ). The
mathematical expression is shown as below
12

(1   u )x xM (1   xM )(1   yM ) xe
Oˆ y  SE  CSE 

1   xM  yM

(14)

ME

The multiplier effect influences the environmental effects of climate policies
through impacting the change volume of final products due to final demand change.
The sign of ME is determined by the consumption substitution elasticity. The final
output

and

final

consumption

of

the

unregulated

sector

satisfy

(1   xM  yM )Oy Py   xM Cx Px  Cy Py . When  u  1 , the expenditure structure keeps
4

consistent. We can get the final output and consumption share the same percentage
change ( Oˆ y  Cˆ y ), and the multiplier effect has no influence on the change rate of
these two variables.  u  1 means that the expenditure share has a negative relation
with the relative price level, and consumers would decrease the share of gross income
spent on the unregulated products; therefore, the sign of ME is negative.  u  1
means that consumers would increase the expenditure share of unregulated products,
and the sign of ME is positive. In addition, the multiplier effect is closely related to
the intermediate input coefficient. When  xM  0 , climate regulations on the
upstream firms would face zero multiplier effect of the regional carbon leakage
because the products of the downstream industry are all used to satisfy the final
consumption.

2.2.4 Production substitution effect
Climate policies would shock the production structure, and the environmental effect
of the production structure change caused by climate regulations is named the
production substitution effect ( PSE ). According to equation (2), we obtain:

4

This is obtained from the equations

Ox Px  Cx Px   yM Oy Py

and

Oy Py  Cy Py   xM Ox Px .
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Eˆ y  SE  CSE  ME  [

y
y
y
y
 yM  yM (1   xM ) xe (eEM
 eMM
)  yK  yM (1   xM ) xe (eEM
 eKM
)

]
1   xM  yM
1   xM  yM

(15)

PSE

The equation (15) reflects that the proportional change of carbon emissions of
the unregulated sector can be explained from the four different effects. The
production substitution effect is made up of two parts. The first part is related to the
intermediate input structure change and the second part is related to the factor input
structure change. Climate regulations would increase the relative price level of
regulated products, and the unregulated sector would reduce the intermediate demand
for products of the regulated sector and increase the factor demand. At the same time,
producers would adjust the factor input structure with the relative price change. The
sign of the production substitution effect is determined by the substitution elasticity.
We can see that the sign of the production substitution effect is ambiguous. The
mathematical expression of carbon leakage appears complex, but we can obtain
several simplified forms for special cases. For instance, when substituting the sectoral
interdependence (  xM  0 and  yM  0 ), the theoretical results are consistent with the
Baylis et al.'s model5.

3. The numerical model
The theoretical model shows the potential impact of the intermediate input linkage on
the carbon leakage problem and demonstrates the importance of considering sectoral
linkage when discussing the carbon leakage. Given that the electricity is widely used
in industrial production as intermediate inputs, and the electricity generation sector is
5

x
x
  xeeEE
) x xe . According to the
When  xM  0 and  yM  0 , we obtain Eˆ y   u x xe  ( xeeKE
i
i
i
i
 ieeEE
0.
character of Allen substitution elasticity, we obtain ik eKK  ieeKE  0 and ik eEK
i
i
i
i
 i  ik eEK  ik eKK  ieeKE  ieeEE
Defining
,
we
obtain
ˆ
Kˆ i  Eˆi   i ( Pˆei  Pˆk ) and Ey   u x xe   x x xe , which is just the result of the FKB model
(Baylis et al., 2014).
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a key target of climate regulations, we take the electricity generation sector as a case
to quantitatively evaluate the magnitude of four different leakage effects identified in
the theoretical model. To that end, this study builds China’s computable general
equilibrium model (CGE) and introduces Structural Decomposition Analysis to link
both the theoretical and empirical models.

3.1 CGE model
The CGE model describes the behaviors of different economic agents (the
government, households and enterprises) by a system of equations. To minimize the
cost, enterprises use intermediate inputs and factor inputs to produce products, subject
to certain technological constraints. Households choose domestic and imported
products to maximize utility under budget constraints. As a tax collector, the
government determines its expenditures, transfers and savings, according to the tax
revenues. The static CGE model constructed by this paper is made up of four blocks:
production, consumption and trade, emissions and policy, equilibrium and closure.
The database is the social accounting matrix (SAM) of 42 sectors of China in 2007,
which is obtained from the Development Research Center of the State Council. The
sectoral carbon emissions are calculated based on the fossil fuel demand (NBS, 2008)
and carbon emissions factors (IPCC, 2006).

3.1.1 Production
The production technology is represented by a five-stage nested constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) production function. The nesting structure of production is shown
in Figure 1. Being taken out of the intermediate input nest, the energy is incorporated
into the value-added nest. The final output is compositions of value-added-energy
15

composite

and

intermediate

inputs

through

a

Leontief

function.

The

value-added-energy composite is the composition of capital-energy composite and
labor. Labor is divided into agricultural labor, production labor, and professional labor.
Energy is divided into electricity and non-electricity. Non-electricity is the
composition of coal and non-coal, which is made up of natural gas and refined fossil
fuels. The energy substitution elasticities used in this paper are derived from the
existing literature (Stern, 2012; Beckman et al., 2011). The capital/energy/labor
substitution elasticities are obtained from Lv et al. (2009).

<<insert figure 1 here>>

3.1.2 Consumption and trade
Households earn income from the factor return and government transfer. All the
income is spent on commodities, direct taxes, and household savings. To maximize
the utility, households' behaviors are described by constant elasticity of substitution
function. The consumption demand for certain products is positively related to the
real income level and is negatively related to the price level. Under climate
regulations, consumers will adjust their consumption structure with the change of
income and price levels. The enterprise earns revenue by sold products. The revenue
is spent on intermediate goods, transferred to household through factor return, and
paid tax to the government. The total domestic demand for manufactured goods is
determined by the intermediate input demand of enterprises, final consumption
demand of households and the government, and products exported to foreign
countries. This demand pool is satisfied by a combination of goods produced by
different companies in the domestic market and other regions. We assume that the
16

products of different regions compete as imperfect substitutes (the Armington
assumption). The elasticity parameters are obtained from the previous literature (Tarr,
2012).

. <<insert figure 2 here>>

3.1.3 Emissions and policy
The sectoral emissions are calculated by multiplying the demand of different fossil by
the carbon emissions factors. Under the complete information and perfect competition
assumption, the CGE model assumes that the carbon price is equal to the trading price
of carbon permits. Qi and Cheng (2015) note that the difference in carbon price of the
seven carbon trading pilots decrease gradually, ranging from 24 to 55 Yuan per ton.
China’s seven carbon emissions trading pilots all cover both direct and indirect
emissions from electricity. This study simulates the effect of pricing a carbon at Yuan
30 per ton in the electricity sector. All tax revenues will be returned to the households
through payment of transfer. For simplicity, the study assumes that the carbon
abatement cost of the electricity generation sector can be passed through to the
downstream industries directly6.

6

Electricity tariffs have remained controlled by the central government since China
split State Power Corporation and separated electricity generation from its
transmission and distribution in 2002. While electricity tariffs were raised few times
under the coal-electricity price “co-movement” mechanism, they still remain flat and
regulated (Zhang, 2014). This not only reduces the effectiveness of addressing the
daunting challenges to cut emissions and strengthen industrial upgrading, but also
complicates implementing the pilot carbon trading schemes in the power sectors in
China. The latter creates a new impetus for power pricing reforms to allow the
pass-through of carbon costs in the electricity sector as a result of implementing
carbon trading (Zhang, 2015a,b). The encouraging sign is that the central government
recently released several documents to further deepen and speed up the reform of
power pricing reform (The Central Committee of Communist Party of China and The
State Council, 2015; The State Council, 2016).
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3.1.4 Equilibrium and closure
CGE model incorporates commodity market, factor market, and exchange market of
domestic and foreign products. The equilibrium module presents the clearance of each
market. For instance, commodity market clearance implies that the value of gross
output equals the sum of intermediate input and final demands. The closure module
describes the balance of saving-investment, government budget, and international
payments. This paper adopts the neoclassical closure principle. First, total investment
in the economy is adjusted to the gross savings (household savings, corporate savings,
government savings, public sector surplus earnings and foreign savings) to balance
the savings-investment closure. Secondly, the tax rate, transfer payments and
government consumption are fixed, while government saving is endogenous to
balance the government budget closure. Thirdly, the exchange rate is endogenously
determined to balance the international payments.

3.2 Structural decomposition analysis
Using the numerical model presented above, we could simulate the economic and
environmental effects of climate regulations on the electricity generation sector.
However, CGE model only reports the single net aggregated simulation result without
showing the fact that different effect may be offset against each other (Baylis et al.,
2014). This study introduces the Structural Decomposition Analysis to numerically
evaluate the four different leakage effects presented in the theoretical model. We
suppose that G represents the real gross domestic product, S represents the
sectoral share of final demand, B represents the Leontif matrix (1  A)1 , F
represents the sectoral carbon matrix, which is related to the energy consumption
structure and carbon emission coefficient of the fossil energy. The sectoral direct
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emissions satisfy

E  FBSG

(18)

According to the structural decomposition analysis, the change of sector
emissions is presented below:

E '  E 0  F ' B ' S 'G '  F 0 B 0 S 0 G 0
 F 0 IS 0 (G '  G 0 )  F 0 I ( S '  S 0 )' G '  F 0 ( B 0  I )( S 'G '  S 0G 0 )
SE

CSE

(19)

ME

( F ' B '  F 0 B 0 ) S 'G '
PSE

The first part reflects the environmental effect of climate regulations due to the
gross economic scale change, which reflects the scale effect. The second part reflects
the change of carbon emissions due to the consumption structure change, which is
0
related to the consumption substitution effect. The intermediate input linkage ( B  I )

has an amplification effect on the scale and consumption substitution effects of carbon
leakage, which represents the multiplier effect. Being consistent with the theoretical
model, the fourth part reflects the production substitution effect, which is related to
both the change of intermediate input structure and energy consumption structure.

4. Numerical results
This section presents numerical simulations of the economic and environmental
effects of carbon regulation. We aggregate the 42 sector in the CGE model into
agricultural, industrial, and service sectors.
<<insert table 1 here>>
Table 1 shows the economic effects of the policy simulation at both macro and
sectoral levels. It should be pointed out that the CGE model in this study is a static
model, which focuses on the short-term effects of climate regulations. Climate
regulations on the electricity generation sector have a negative impact on the economy
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scale, represented by real GDP. The results show that the change rate of real GDP is
-0.32%. This means the carbon pricing would put a downward pressure on China’s
economic growth in the short term. At sectoral level, climate regulations have a much
more severe impact on the industrial sector, especially the electricity generation sector.
The electricity production decreases by 5.45%. At the same time, the gross emissions
and carbon intensity decrease by 4.12% and 3.81%, respectively. This means that the
carbon pricing would help to achieve China’s target of 40-45% carbon intensity
reduction by 2020, compared with 2005 level. In addition, climate regulations
increase the overall price level. The consumer price index (CPI) increases by 0.51%.
The electricity price level would increase by 3.55%, which would further raise the
production cost of other sectors. We further present the environmental effects of
climate regulation and decompose the sectoral emissions change into different terms.
The aggregated results are presented in Table 2 and the decomposition of sectoral
emissions change is presented in Appendix B.
<<insert table 2 here>>
As shown in Table 2, we decompose the change of sectoral emissions into four
components: the scale effect, the consumption substitution effect, the multiplier effect,
and the production substitution effect. The first four columns present the volume and
percentage changes in sectoral emissions due to four different effects, and the last
column shows the overall change. The results suggest that the climate regulation
reduces the emissions of unregulated and regulated sectors by 38.79 and 171.51
million tons. Defined as the share of the change in unregulated-sector emissions to the
reduction in regulated-sector emissions, the sectoral carbon leakage rate is 22.62%.
The numerical simulations show that imposing a carbon price of Yuan 30 per ton
on Chin's electricity generation sector would decrease GDP by 0.32%. This explains
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the negative sign of the scale effect on the emissions of unregulated sectors. For
example, the scale effect contributes to a decrease in carbon emissions of the
agricultural sector by 0.10% or 129.38 thousand tons. Carbon pricing regulation
would increase the electricity price level and the price of other products that use
electricity as intermediate input. The industrial sector is more sensitive to the
electricity price, which would have a relatively higher price level. Consumers adjust
the consumption structure, and the consumption substitution effect leads to increases
in carbon emissions of the agricultural and service industries.
Table 2 shows that the multiplier effect contributes to negative carbon leakage.
The climate regulation shrinks the final demand, and the final output and emissions
correspond to a larger decrease because the amplification effect of the sectoral linkage.
Therefore, the multiplier effect has a negative sign. At the same time, climate
regulations shock the intermediate input structure. For instance, the climate regulation
promotes firms to use more clean intermediate and factor inputs, so the production
substitution effect also corresponds to negative carbon leakage. Both the multiplier
effect and the production substitution effect are closely related to the sectoral linkage.

5. Conclusions
Climate regulations tend to cover a limited number of energy-intensive sectors and
thus lead to the carbon leakage across sectors. Considering that the regulated products,
such as electricity, are widely used in industrial production as intermediate inputs, we
attempt to disentangle the influence mechanism of intermediate input linkage on the
carbon leakage problem.
This present study develops a Harberger-type model considering the sectoral
intermediate input linkage structure and provides the closed form solutions for four
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leakage effects. We find that intermediate input linkage has important implications for
assessing the carbon leakage. The sectoral linkage directly impacts the carbon leakage
problem through the multiplier effect. At the same time, producers would adjust the
intermediate input structure due to climate policies, which is related to the production
substitution effect. In addition, the sectoral linkage has an impact on the magnitude of
the scale effect and the consumption substitution effects. This present study builds
China’s computable general equilibrium model, proposes a method to link the
theoretical and numerical models by adopting Structural Decomposition Analysis and
examines the effects of China’s climate regulations on the electricity generation sector.
The numerical results show that climate regulations on the electricity generation
sector would result in a significant leakage, which is mainly determined by the
production substitution effect, followed by the multiplier effect. Both two effects are
closely related to the sectoral linkage. This highlights the importance of considering
intermediate input linkage when discussing the carbon leakage problem of climate
policies.
There are several potential extensions. First, the theoretical model constructed by
this study can also represent two countries linked through intermediate goods trade,
which could be adopted to analyze the regional carbon leakage of unilateral climate
policies. Second, this study only discusses four different carbon leakage effects.
Future studies could discuss the other leakage channels omitted by this study. Third,
the empirical study adopts parameters from the literature rather than being estimated
econometrically. The theoretical model shows that carbon leakage is sensitive to
substitution elasticities; therefore, future studies should address this issue. Finally, this
study discusses the environmental effect of China’s climate regulations on the
electricity generation sector, and the analytical framework of this study can be
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adopted to discuss climate policies of the other regions.
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Appendix A. Parameters, variables and equations of the theoretical model
Table A 1. Parameters, variables and equations of the theoretical model
(a) Parameters of the theoretical model
Parameters
i, j
m,n
k
e












Explanations
Sector
Factor inputs
Capital
Allen elasticity
Intermediate and factor input share
Clean and dirty factor input share
Substitution elasticity
Capital distribution
Carbon distribution
Total income distribution
Climate policy shock

(b) Variables of the theoretical model
Variables

Explanations

Oˆ x

Proportional change of the output of sector X

Oˆ y

Proportional change of the output of sector Y

Cˆ x

Proportional change of the consumption demand of sector X

Cˆ y

Proportional change of the consumption demand of sector Y

Mˆ x

Proportional change of the intermediate input of sector X

Mˆ y

Proportional change of the intermediate input of sector Y

Eˆ x

Proportional change of the carbon emissions of sector X

Eˆ y
Kˆ

x

Kˆ y
Pˆ
ex

Pˆey

Proportional change of the carbon emissions of sector Y
Proportional change of the capital input of sector X
Proportional change of the capital input of sector Y
Proportional change of the carbon price of sector X
Proportional change of the carbon price of sector Y

Pˆx
Pˆ

Proportional change of the final output price of sector X

Pˆk
Iˆ

Proportional change of the capital return

y

N̂
Ĝ

Proportional change of the final output price of sector Y
Proportional change of the total price level
Proportional change of the nominal GDP
Proportional change of the real GDP
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(c) Equations of the theoretical model
Modules

Equations
Oˆ x   xM Mˆ x  (1   xM ) xk Kˆ x  (1   xM ) xe Eˆ x
Oˆ y   yM Mˆ y  (1   yM ) yk Kˆ y  (1   yM ) ye Eˆ y
x
x
x
x
Mˆ x  Eˆ x   xM (eMM
 eEM
) Pˆy  (1   xM ) xk (eMK
 eEK
) Pˆk
x
x
(1   xM ) xe (eME
 eEE
) Pˆex
x
x
x
x
Kˆ x  Eˆ x   xM (eKM
 eEM
) Pˆy  (1   xM ) xk (eKK
 eEK
) Pˆk

Production
module

x
x
(1   xM ) xe (eKE
 eEE
) Pˆex
y
y
y
y
Mˆ y  Eˆ y   yM (eMM
 eEM
) Pˆx  (1   yM ) yk (eMK
 eEK
) Pˆk
y
y
(1   yM ) ye (eME
 eEE
) Pˆey
y
y
y
y
Kˆ y  Eˆ y   yM (eKM
 eEM
) Pˆx  (1   yM ) yk (eKK
 eEK
) Pˆk
y
y
(1   yM ) ye (eKE
 eEE
) Pˆey

 x Kˆ x   y Kˆ y  0
Pˆx   xM Pˆy  (1   xM )( xk Pˆk   xe Pˆex )
Pˆy   yM Pˆx  (1   yM )( yk Pˆk   ye Pˆey )

Iˆ  x Pˆx  y Pˆy

Price module

Nˆ 

x   yM y
 xM x  y
(1   xM )(Oˆ x  Pˆx ) 
(1   yM )(Oˆ y  Pˆy )
1   xM  yM
1   xM  yM

Gˆ  Nˆ  Iˆ
Pˆ  0
k

Cˆ x  Cˆ y   u ( Pˆy  Pˆx )

Consumption
module

Policy module

( u  1) yM y ˆ ˆ
Oˆ x  Cˆ x 
( Px  Py )
x   yM y

(  1) xM x ˆ ˆ
Oˆ y  Cˆ y  u
( Py  Px )
 xM x  y

Pˆex  
Pˆey  0

27

Appendix B. Decomposition analysis of sectoral emissions change
Sectors
01

Agricultural

02

Coal Ming

03

Crude Oil Mining

04

Metal Ore Mining

05

Nonmetal Ore Mining

06

Food

07

Textile

08

Apparel

09

Wood Processing

10

Paper

11

Oil Processing

12

Chemical

13

Nonmetallic Mineral Products

14

Metal Smelting

15

Metal Products

16

Machinery

17

Transport Equipment

18

Electronic Machine

19

Telecommunications Equipment

20

Instrument

21

Other Manufacturing

22

Waste

23

Electricity Production

24

Gas

25

Water

26

Construction

27

Transport

28

Post

29

Information Transmission

30

Commerce

31

Restaurant

32

Finance

33

Real Estate

34

Lease Business

35

Travel

36

Science

37

Technical Services

38

Other Social Services

39

Education

40

Health, Security, Welfare

41

Culture, Sports, Entertainment

SE

CSE

ME

PSE

Sum

-0.10%
0.00%
0.19%
0.20%
0.01%
-0.15%
-0.09%
-0.21%
-0.11%
-0.04%
0.01%
0.00%
-0.01%
0.00%
-0.07%
-0.12%
-0.14%
-0.12%
-0.09%
-0.04%
-0.19%
0.09%
-0.01%
-0.11%
-0.08%
-0.31%
-0.07%
-0.04%
-0.15%
-0.16%
-0.14%
-0.08%
-0.24%
-0.07%
-0.01%
-0.08%
-0.22%
-0.16%
-0.29%
-0.29%
-0.15%

0.13%
0.00%
0.01%
-1.58%
-0.20%
0.14%
0.03%
0.09%
0.07%
-0.06%
-0.04%
-0.34%
-0.06%
-0.21%
-0.05%
-0.09%
0.02%
-0.10%
-0.24%
-0.21%
0.02%
0.31%
-0.93%
-0.01%
-0.83%
0.58%
0.08%
0.01%
0.25%
0.27%
0.11%
0.24%
0.82%
-0.05%
-0.17%
0.11%
0.22%
0.20%
0.25%
0.05%
0.13%

-0.13%
-1.06%
-1.05%
-1.24%
-0.29%
-0.10%
-0.19%
-0.10%
-0.11%
-0.29%
-0.57%
-0.57%
0.02%
-0.43%
-0.32%
-0.32%
-0.19%
-0.33%
-0.53%
-0.59%
-0.17%
-0.66%
-1.06%
-0.44%
-0.42%
0.00%
-0.22%
-0.22%
-0.15%
-0.20%
-0.14%
-0.33%
-0.05%
-0.22%
-0.50%
-0.32%
-0.16%
-0.17%
-0.02%
-0.05%
-0.15%

-2.27%
-3.44%
-3.36%
-1.44%
-1.43%
-2.02%
-2.08%
-1.41%
-2.05%
-2.09%
-1.28%
-0.87%
-1.06%
-0.97%
-1.91%
-1.87%
-2.10%
-2.18%
-2.23%
-2.54%
-1.84%
-2.34%
-3.78%
-1.27%
-2.39%
-1.29%
-0.58%
-1.37%
-2.72%
-2.33%
-2.01%
-2.15%
-1.27%
-1.06%
-2.24%
-1.31%
-1.44%
-1.38%
-2.30%
-2.11%
-1.82%

-2.36%
-4.51%
-4.21%
-4.06%
-1.91%
-2.14%
-2.33%
-1.63%
-2.20%
-2.47%
-1.88%
-1.79%
-1.11%
-1.61%
-2.35%
-2.40%
-2.41%
-2.73%
-3.10%
-3.38%
-2.18%
-2.60%
-5.78%
-1.84%
-3.72%
-1.03%
-0.80%
-1.61%
-2.76%
-2.41%
-2.18%
-2.33%
-0.74%
-1.40%
-2.91%
-1.60%
-1.60%
-1.52%
-2.36%
-2.40%
-1.99%
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Sectors
42

Public Administrate

SE

CSE

ME

PSE

Sum

-0.32%

0.32%

0.00%

-1.62%

-1.62%

Notes: The scale effect may contribute to an increase in sectoral emissions because
the sectoral share of GDP can be negative. For instance, the mining sector has big
trade deficit, which results in negative sectoral share of GDP for the mining sector.
The consumption effect may contribute to negative carbon leakage because these
sectors are closely related to the electricity sector either directly or indirectly.
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Figure 1. Production structure of the CGE model
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Figure 2. Consumption structure of the CGE model
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Tables
Table 1. Aggregated effects of climate regulations
Change rate
Real GDP

-0.32%

Gross emissions

-4.12%

Carbon intensity

-3.81%

CPI

0.51%

Output change rate

Price change rate

-0.15%

0.23%

Electricity

-5.45%

3.55%

Other industries

-0.71%

0.83%

-0.25%

0.23%

Agriculture
Industry
Service

Table 2. Decomposition analysis of environmental effects of climate regulations
(thousand tons)

Agriculture
Electricity
Industry
Other industries
Services

SE

CSE

ME

PSE

Sum

-129.38

173.27

-171.76

-3050.33

-3178.20

(-0.10%)

(0.13%)

(-0.13%)

(-2.27%)

(-2.36%)

-355.78

-27602.37

-31478.14

-112070.22

-171506.51

(-0.01%)

(-0.93%)

(-1.06%)

(-3.78%)

(-5.78%)

-575.80

-1669.89

-5809.16

-23214.79

-31269.64

(-0.04%)

(-0.10%)

(-0.36%)

(-1.43%)

(-1.93%)

-400.27

393.61

-757.14

-3569.84

-4333.66

(-0.11%)

(0.10%)

(-0.20%)

(-0.94%)

(-1.14%)

Notes: The number in parentheses represents the change rate of sectoral emissions (%). SE:
scale effect; CSE: consumption substitution effect; ME: multiplier effect; PSE: production
substitution effect.
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